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Panel II: Censorship of Cable
Television's Leased and Public Access
Channels: Current Status of Alliance for
Community Media v. FCC
Moderator: Paula A. Franzese, Esq.a
Panelists: Stuart W. Gold, Esq.b
Marjorie Heins, Esq.c
James N. Horwood, Esq.d
Robert T. Perry, Esq.'
Andrew Jay Schwartzman, Esq.'
DANIELLE RUBANO: The second panel of today's Sympo-
sium is "Censorship of Cable Television's Leased and Public Ac-
cess Channels." It is my great pleasure to introduce Professor
Paula Franzese from Seton Hall School of Law who will be moder-
ating the second panel.
Professor Franzese received her B.A. from Barnard College,
summa cum laude, and her J.D. from Columbia University. She
has lectured throughout the country on various issues, and has
taught law at the University of Parma, Italy, as well as here at
Fordham University School of Law.
Please welcome Paula Franzese.
a. Professor, Seton Hall University School of Law, Barnard College, B.A., summa
cum laude 1980; Columbia University School of Law, J.D. 1983.
b. Partner, Cravath, Swaine & Moore, New York, NY; Brooklyn College of the City
University of New York, B.A. 1969; New York University School of Law, J.D. 1972.
c. Counsel, Arts Censorship Project, American Civil Liberties Union, Cornell Univer-
sity, B.A. 1967; HarvardLaw School, J.D., magna cum laude 1978.
d. Partner, Spiegel & McDiarmid, Washington D.C.; University of Pennsylvania, B.S.
1958, LL.B. 1961.
e. Professor, New York University Tisch School for the Arts, New York, NY; Brown
University, Sc.B.-A.B. 1969, M.S. 1974; Columbia University School of Law, J.D. 1974.
f. Media Access Project; University of Pennsylvania, A.B. 1968, J.D. 1971.
466 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
PROF FRANZESE: Good morning, and thank you. Welcome
to this panel. As you just heard, we are going to take the opportu-
nity to explore issues concerning censorship of cable television's
leased channels and public access channels. We will also be focus-
ing on the status of a case called Alliance for Community Media v.
FCC.'
In June of 1995, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
upheld the constitutionality of the indecency provisions of the Ca-
ble Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992
(the "1992 Act").2 The court ruled, in an en banc opinion, that the
1992 Act, which allows cable television operators to prohibit inde-
cent programming on leased and public access channels, did not
involve state action., State action is required to trigger a First
Amendment violation or protection.4
The Alliance court further held that access channels are not
public forums.5 In addition, the 1992 Act's provisions, which re-
quire operators to segregate and block indecent programming on
leased access channels,6 were held to be the least restrictive means
of limiting the channels' access to children,7 who would be at the
greatest risk from exposure to indecent programming. The matter
has been briefed and will be argued before the U.S. Supreme Court
on February 21, 1996. 9
1. 10 F.3d 812 (D.C. Cir. 1993), vacated and en banc reh'g granted, 15 F.3d 186
(D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc), reh'g en banc, 56 F.3d 105 (D.C. Cir. 1995), cert. granted sub
nom. Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct.
471 (1995).
2. Alliance, 56 F.3d at 113; Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition
Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. § 1460 (1995) (codified in scattered sections
of 47 U.S.C.) [hereinafter 1992 Act].
3. Alliance, 56 F.3d at 116.
4. Id. at 113.
5. Id. at 121.
6. 1992 Act § 10(b), 47 U.S.C. § 5320).
7. Alliance, 56 F.3d at 125.
8. id.
9. Brief for Petitioners Alliance for Community Media, Alliance for Communications
Democracy, and People for the American Way, Alliance for Community Media v. FCC
(No. 95-227) (consolidated with No. 95-124). Brief for Petitioners, Denver Area Educ.
Telecommunications Consortium v. FCC (No. 95-124) (consolidated with 95-227).
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We come together this morning at a rather auspicious time
because less than a week ago, Congress rewrote the nation's com-
munications laws by passing a bill that will transform, among other
media, cable television-the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (the
"1996 Act").'
We will hear commentaries this morning on the actual impact
and future implications of the telecommunications overhaul of
cable television. Who. will have access to the burgeoning cable
opportunities? What limitations will be imposed? How significant
a threat is the potential for private censorship?
To help us consider these questions, as well as several other
thorny concerns, we have with us a very formidable group of pan-
elists. James Horwood is a partner with Spiegel & McDiarmid in
Washington, D.C. He has worked closely with the Alliance for
Community Media. Robert Perry is a Professor at the NYU School
of Communications, and has litigated many media cases, including.
cable access cases. Marjorie Heins, of the American Civil Liber-
ties Union ("ACLU"), has worked on a host of censorship related
contexts and cases. Stuart Gold of Cravath, Swaine & Moore has
been counsel to a myriad of media as well as First Amendment
cases. Finally, Andrew Schwartzman is an integral part of the First
(Additional Briefs have been filed for: Brief for New York City Petitioners, Alliance;
Brief for Association of American Publishers as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners,
Denver and Alliance; Brief for the Federal Respondents, Alliance; Brief of Time Warner
Cable as-Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, Denver). Copies of the Briefs are
on file in the office of the Fordham Intellectual Property, Media, & Entertainment Law
Journal. A transcript of the Feb. 21, 1996 oral argument is available at 1996 WL 82192.
10. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. § 56 (to be
codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.) [hereinafter 1996 Act]. The history of com-
munications regulation began with the Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. § 1064 (Jun.
19, 1934) (enacted for the purpose of regulating interstate and foreign commerce in
communication by wire and radio and creating the FCC). The Act has been amended
repeatedly through the years. Most notably, in 1992 Congress passed the Cable Televi-
sion Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat.
§ 1460 (1995) (codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.) which was enacted to: pro-
mote the availability to the public of a diversity of views and information through cable
television and other distribution media; maximize availability to ensure continued expan-
sion of capacity of programs offered on cable systems; protect consumer interests in
receipt of cable service; and ensure cable television operators do not have undue market
power. Most recently, the Act was amended by the 1996 Act, supra.
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Amendment efforts of The Media Access Project in Washington,
D.C., a public interest telecommunication law firm's First Amend-
ment efforts.
I would like to first present Mr. Jim Horwood.
MR. HORWOOD: Thank you. As you will find from listening
to this panel, four of us were delighted with the Supreme Court's
decision to hear the appeal from the en banc decision in the Alli-
ance case. I suspect one panelist was not delighted with that deci-
sion. I believe that will become apparent.
Let me give you a little background about what leased and
"PEG"" access channels are, which may help to explain correctly
what the en banc court misunderstood.
Going back to the early 1960s, many local cable franchises
required the reservation of capacity for use by people other than
the cable operators or other dominant media buyers.' 2 These were
reserved as franchises for public, educational and governmental
use. 13 To a lesser, but still relevant extent, there were required
reservations for leased access channels in some franchises.14 These
channels were to be used by individuals other than a cable operator
who paid for broadcast time.
When Congress passed the Cable Communications Policy Act
of 1984 (the "1984 Act"),15 which provided for federal regulation
and federal pre-emption over local and state franchising, it permit-
ted local and state franchising authorities to continue to require
public, educational and governmental channels.' 6 It also required
leased channels to be provided on cable systems. 7 The number of
leased channels varied by the size of the system."
The purpose for PEG channels, as set forth in the legislative
11. Public, Educational, or Governmental channels. See Alliance, 56 F.3d at 111.
12. See DANIEL L. BRENNER & MONROE E. PRICE, CABLE TELEVISION AND OTHER NON-
BROADCAST VIDEO § 6.04(l)-(2), at 6-32 (1994).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C. §§ 521 et seq. (1988)
(hereinafter 1984 Act].
16. 1984 Act § 611(b), 47 U.S.C. § 531(b).
17. id. § 612(b)(1), 47 U.S.C. § 532 (b)(1).
18. id.
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history, was to "provide groups and individuals who generally have
not had access to the electronic media with the opportunity to be-
come sources of information in the electronic marketplace of
ideas."'19 These channels "contribute to an informed citizenry by
bringing local schools into the home and by showing the local
public government at work."20 This was the Congressional under-
standing of why these kinds of channels had been required in many
franchises, and the reason why Congress was going to permit the
continuation of these required channels. Leased access was also
available. Generally, the PEG channels were for non-commercial
use, and leased access channels were for commercial use.2'
Bob Joffe, in the previous panel, talked about his view of why
these kinds of requirements are unconstitutional.22 Time-Warner
has appealed a decision finding these requirements to be constitu-
tional.23 I am firmly of the view that PEG channels, and the way
they are established and set up, are constitutional. I think it is
analogous to requiring a housing developer to provide green space
for public parks. The government is granting a special privilege to
the cable operator to use public streets and public rights of way.
In return, the government can require a reasonable amount of that
capacity be set aside for public purposes that promote the public
good, so long as it is done in a content neutral way.
Bob Perry is going to talk about why public access channels
are, and should be, viewed as public fora. Leased access is a little
bit different, in that it is like common carriage.24 The leased access
users pay for the use of their channels.25 I do not see any First
Amendment issue arising out of a requirement to take part of this
19. H.R. REP. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 30 (1984).
20. Id.
21. See, e.g., 1984 Act § 612(b), 47 U.S.C. § 542(b); BRENNER & PRICE, supra note
12, §§ 6.04(3)(b), 6.05(2)(c), at 6-38, 6-57.
22. See Symposium, The Changing Landscape of Jurisprudence in Light of the New
Communications and Media Alliances, 6 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 427
(1996) [hereinafter Panel I].
23. Daniels Cablevision, Inc. v. United States, 835 F Supp. 1 (D.C. Cir. 1993),
appeal pending sub nom. Time Warner Entertainment Co. v. FCC, 56 F.3d 151 (D.C. Cir.
1995).
24. BRENNER & PRICE, supra note 12, § 6.05(1)(b), at 6-51.
25. 1984 Act § 612(c)(1), 47 U.S.C. § 532(c)(1).
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capacity and make it available on a common carriage basis.
In the 1984 Act, Congress prohibited any kind of censorship on
PEG or leased access channels.26 It allowed, however, provisions
to keep obscene programs off these channels. 27 Obscenity, howev-
er, is not an issue that we will be talking about in regards to the
1992 Act and the Alliance case. Obscenity has always been pro-
hibited. 28 It was prohibited under the 1984 Act, 29 and this was not
changed under the 1992 Act, with one exception. 30 The 1992 Act
eliminated a statutory provision that exempted cable operators from
liability for any obscene material that appeared on access channels
over which the cable operators did not exercise any editorial con-
trol. 3
1
I believe that the provision in the 1984 Act was correct, and
that Congress was wrong to remove the statutory immunity. If the
operator cannot exercise editorial control, the operator should not
be subject to any kind of liability for what it carries.
Neither the federal government's U.S. Supreme Court brief, nor
the intervenor amici briefs presented any argument that the removal
of a cable operator's immunity is important or necessary in order
to proscribe obscene programming. 32
Obscenity on cable television was always punishable. Under
the 1984 Act, programmers or editors could be punished for carry-
ing obscenity.33 If the cable operator is not producing a program
or functioning as an editor in helping select the speech, the opera-
tor should not be liable for its content. Liability should be focused
on the programmer. Indeed, there is at least one instance of which
I am aware, where a programmer was prosecuted for putting on
obscene programming. 34 In that case, both the organization manag-
26. Id. § 611(e), 612(c)(2), 47 U.S.C. §§ 531(e), 532(c)(2).
27. Id. § 624(d), 47 U.S.C. § 544(d).
28. See Alliance, 56 F.3d at 112; see also R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
29. 1984 Act § 639, 47 U.S.C. § 559.
30. See 1992 Act § 10(a)-(d), 47 U.S.C. §§ 532(h), 532(j), 531, 558.
31. 47 U.S.C. § 558.
32. See supra note 9.
33. 1984 Act §§ 638, 639, 47 U.S.C. §§ 558, 559.
34. See Jack Chambers, Slowing the Flow of Societal Sewage, SAN DIEGO UNION-
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ing the access channel and the local franchising authority were
originally named in the suit.35  The suit against them was later
dismissed because they did not exercise control over content.36
The 1992 Act "permits" cable operators to keep indecent pro-
grams off access channels.37 Other kinds of programs may also be
prohibited, but let us talk about indecency which is what is now
really driving matters.
Indecency has been defined as "programming that describes or
depicts sexual or excretory activities or organs in a patently offen-
sive manner as measured by contemporary community standards
for the cable media. ' 38 There are problems with the vagueness and
over-breadth of this definition,39 which Marjorie Heins will talk
about later, but it has to be borne in mind that here we are discuss-
ing speech that is short of obscenity. Speech that reaches the point
of obscenity because it "appeals to prurient interests and, taken as
a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value"
can be kept off cable.40 If such speech is on cable or on access
channels, it can be dealt with under criminal and civil law.4' We
TRIBUNE, Apr. 15, 1994, at B7; Austin Cable Show Found Obscene, Two Convicted for
Program; They Say Video Endorses Safe Sex, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Apr. 11, 1994, at
10D.
35. See generally Jim Phillips, Obscenity Convictions Draw Praise, Opposition//
Officials Say 'Infosex' Verdicts Probably Won't Inhibit AIDs Education, AUSTIN AMERICAN-
STATESMAN, Apr. 10, 1994, at Al.
36. Id.
37. 1992 Act §§ 10(a),(c), 47 U.S.C. §§ 532(h), 531.
38. Implementation of § 10 of the Consumer Protection and Competition Act of
1992, 58 Fed. Reg. 7990, 7993 (1993) (codified at 47 C.F.R. § 76.701(g)).
39. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973); see also Alliance, 56 F.3d at
112 n.4.
40. 47 U.S.C. § 531. The Supreme Court set up a three-part test to determine if a
work is obscene in Miller:
(a) whether "the average person applying contemporary standards" would find
that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interests; (b) whether
the work depicts or describes in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specif-
ically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as
a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
413 U.S. at 24.
41. 18 U.S.C. § 1468(a) (1994) provides "whoever knowingly utters any obscene
matter by means of cable television or subscription services on television, shall be pun-
1996]
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are talking about speech that falls short of obscenity, and therefore
is constitutionally protected speech.
The D.C. Circuit in the panel decision in Alliance found that
this law and the implementing regulations were unconstitutional.42
Congress set up a scheme that defined the speech permitted on
access channels on a content basis. Thus, constitutionally protected
speech was divided into two categories: indecent speech and not
indecent speech. In doing so, Congress engaged in a content based
action, and that was state action.43
The en banc decision, accepting arguments that had been raised
by others, including the government, said there was no state ac-
tion.44 It determined that Congress had only restored to cable oper-
ators the right to program on all channels, which they had prior to
the 1984 Act.
As I mentioned earlier, that is factually incorrect. These chan-
nels existed on most cable systems prior to 1984, so this was not
a restoration by Congress. 45 The 1992 Act preempted local fran-
chising authorities and state laws that prohibited cable operators
from censoring these channels. 4
6
The government, in its brief filed with the Supreme Court,
takes a different approach, and abandons the state action argument
that it raised earlier.47 The government is not drawing a line and
claiming there is no state action here. Now the government is
conceding that yes, there is state action to the extent that any pas-
sage of a law constitutes state action.48
ished by imprisonment for not more than 2 years or by a fine in accordance with this title,
or both." The civil law dealing with obscenity on cable is in the 1984 Act §§ 638, 639,
47 U.S.C. §§ 558, 559.
42. Alliance, 10 F.3d at 812, 815.
43. Id. at 820.
44. Alliance, 56 F.3d at 113.
45. Id. at 109.
46. 1992 Act § 10(a),(c), 47 U.S.C. §§ 532(h), 531.
47. Brief for the Federal Respondents at 24, Denver Area Educ. Telecommunications
Consortium v. FCC, and Alliance for Community Media v. FCC (Nos. 95-124 and 95-
227) [hereinafter Brief for the Federal Respondents].
48. id.
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So the government's brief now acknowledges that there is state
action. But what the brief gives with one hand, it takes away with
the other by saying that this may be state action, but then inquiring
into what kind of state action it is and how it should be reviewed.
The brief asserts that reasonable viewpoint-neutral regulation in this
context is particularly unobjectionable where the subject of the
regulation is indecent expression. However, the Supreme Court has
invalidated laws that bar all access to indecent material, regardless
of whether such measures are necessary to protect the welfare of
children or the rights of third parties.49
Rather than applying strict scrutiny, which the Supreme Court
has consistently required in evaluating content based laws,50 the
government argues for the application of a reasonableness test.5"
That test asks whether the law is a reasonable action for Congress
to be taking to deal with this kind of speech.
Bear in mind, however, that this is a content based distinction.
Congress did not say that cable operators can exercise editorial
control over these channels. Congress provided that cable opera-
49. Id. at 26.
50. The phrase "strict scrutiny" originates from Justice Stone's opinion in United
States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144 n.4 (1938) (Stone referred to "more exacting
judicial scrutiny" and "more searching judicial scrutiny"). Justice Douglas was the first
to actually use the term "strict scrutiny" in Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
See WALTER F. MURPHY, Er. AL, AMERICAN CONSMI1JrONAL INTERPRETATION 689 (1986). This
test has been applied to "content based abridgements" of speech. In order for a content-
based statute to stand in light of the First Amendment, the government must show that
the statute is necessary to further a compelling state interest, and is narrowly tailored to
meet that end. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-8, at 602 (2d
ed. 1988). See, e.g., Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct 2445, 2458;
reh'g denied, 115 S. Ct. 30 (1994); R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992); Simon
& Schuster, Inc. v. New-York Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105 (1991); Perry Educ.
Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U.S. 37 (1983); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455
(1980).
51. A reasonableness test has been applied in cases where the state has allowed
public property to be used as a public forum to express ideas. Perry, 460 U.S. 37. The
state may impose content neutral "reasonable time, place, and manner regulations" in this
situation and "may reserve the forum for its intended purposes, communicative or other-
wise, as long as the regulation on speech is reasonable and not an effort to suppress
expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker's view." Id. at 46; see also
United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 726 (1990).
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tors can exercise editorial control in this limited way. It set up two
kinds of speech: "good" speech and "bad" speech.52 As far as bad
speech is concerned, if it is reasonable to keep it off, that's fine.
This flies in the face of First Amendment law that has evolved
since the Roth decision almost forty years ago.5 3 Not only is Con-
gress shifting to a reasonableness standard, it is also skipping over
intermediate scrutiny standards.54 Even if the proper test is strict
scrutiny, one could argue that intermediate scrutiny under the
O'Brien case should be applied.55 The O'Brien test asks whether
the statute is sufficiently narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
government interest.
56
Strict scrutiny, which upholds a statute only if it is the least
restrictive means to regulate speech in furtherance of a compelling
interest, 57 is the test I believe should be applied when evaluating a
content based law. Another tier of review is the reasonableness
standard, which the government is now arguing for. Lastly, there
is an intermediate standard of review to determine if a statute is
sufficiently narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government
52. Section 10(a) of the 1992 Act permits a cable operator to refuse to carry leased
access programming that the cable operator "reasonably believes, describes or depicts
sexual or excretory activities or organs in a patently offensive manner as measured by
contemporary community standards." 47 U.S.C. § 532(h). "Good speech" would be
speech that does not come within this definition, and "bad speech" would be speech that
does come within this definition.
53. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
54. The intermediate level of scrutiny upholds a statute as constitutional if it
"serve[s] an important [not compelling] governmental objective and must be substantially
[not closely] related or necessary to achievement of those objectives." MURPHY, supra
note 50, at 816 (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976)). See, e.g., Clark v. Com-
munity for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298 (1984).
55. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). In O'Brien, the Court held that
a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional
power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial government
interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment free-
doms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
id. at 376.
56. Id.
57. See R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 403 (1992); Sable Communications of Cal.
v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).
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interest.58
Under these circumstances, I do not know how strict scrutiny
would really differ from the intermediate scrutiny test. The gov-
ernment brief ignored the intermediate scrutiny analysis.
In the 1984 Act, Congress required cable operators to make
lock boxes available for cable television systems.59 A lock box is
a device that permits the subscriber to block out certain channels
or certain programming. 6° When the Federal Communications
Commission ("FCC") established lock box regulations,6' it original-
ly did not require lock boxes to be made available on access chan-
nels.62 The ACLU and the Alliance's predecessor, the National
Federation of Local Cable Programmers, and others appealed, and
were successful in having lock boxes included for access chan-
nels.63 They wanted lock boxes to be available because they
thought it was important to give subscribers the ability to keep
certain types of programming out.' There is no indication in the
Congressional debates over the 1992 Act that any consideration
was given to whether lock boxes would work.65
Concerning broadcast radio and television, the FCC established
regulations, recently sustained by the D.C. Circuit, that indecent
58. The Supreme Court explained in Turner:
[T]he First Amendment, subject only to narrow and well understood exceptions,
does not countenance governmental control over the content of messages ex-
pressed by private individuals. Our precedents thus apply the most exacting
scrutiny to regulations that suppress, disadvantage, or impose differential bur-
dens upon speech because of its content. In contrast, regulations that are unre-
lated to the content of speech are subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny,
because in most cases they pose a less substantial risk of excising certain ideas
or viewpoints from the public dialogue.
114 S. Ct. at 2458-59 (internal citations omitted).
59. 1984 Act § 624(d)(2), 47 U.S.C. § 544(d)(2).
60. See Alliance, 56 F.3d at 125.
61. Implementation of the Provisions of the Cable Communications Policy Act of
1984, 50 Fed. Reg. 18,637, 18,655 (1985).
62. Id.
63. ACLU v. FCC, 823 F.2d 1554, 1557 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 959
(1988).
64. Id.
65. See H. R. REP. No. 628, 102nd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1992).
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programming can be on a time-channeled basis. Indecent program-
ming may be on only between the hours of 10:00 p.m. and 6:00
a.m., but it cannot be kept off entirely.66 The 1992 Act allowed
cable operators, at their discretion, to prohibit indecent program-
ming on PEG and leased access channels.67 This is more intrusive
than what is required for broadcast television.
The 1992 Act further provided that if a cable operator does not
keep indecent programming off leased access channels, the chan-
nels must be blocked, and subscribers must notify the cable opera-
tor in writing that they want to receive the channels.68 In a sense,
this is a more restrictive provision for leased access channels be-
cause they must either be banned or blocked. In contrast, PEG
channels may be banned, but if not, there is no provision requiring
them to be blocked.69
That is where we are at now under the 1996 Act. As Professor
Franzese mentioned, Congress has continued to tamper with the
First Amendment rights of those individuals who want to use ac-
cess channels either to speak or to receive programming. Congress
has added to the provision that denies a cable operator any editorial
control over PEG channels or leased channels new language stating
that a cable operator may refuse to transmit any public access pro-
gram or portion of a public access program which contains obscen-
ity, indecency, or nudity.70
Thus, we now have something new added to the mix: nudity
in addition to indecency. Congress did not bother defining nudity
when they added it, and I cannot think of another term that is more
overbroad. Statutes banning nudity under certain circumstances
have been upheld, such as where nudity is defined as showing
genitals or bare breasts.7 ' These types of statutes have survived
66. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654, 664 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
67. 1992 Act §§ 10(a), (c), 47 U.S.C. §§ 532(h), 531.
68. Id. at § 10(b), 47 U.S.C. § 5320).
69. Id.
70. 1996 Act § 506(a), 110 Stat. at 136-37 (to be codified as amending 47 U.S.C.
§ 531(e)).
71. See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 631-32 (1968).
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constitutional scrutiny,72 but what does nudity mean here?
How will the 1996 Act play into the arguments presented to the
Supreme Court? How will the decision by the Supreme Court,
assuming the Court does the right thing and finds the FCC's regu-
lations unconstitutional, affect the 1996 Act? I do not know. I am
optimistic that if we are successful in the Supreme Court, this new
provision will also be set aside.
The real difficulty here is that the indecency provision of the
1992 Act and the indecency provision of the 1996 Act are going to
prevent expression by people who express themselves in ways that
some might find offensive. The FCC's regulations indicate that
material is indecent if it is determined to be so within the reason-
able view of the cable operator.13 How cable operators will view
this responsibility is going to be problematic. We do not know
what kind of pressures they will be under from subscribers who
find certain programming offensive.
The kinds of programming that may be at issue are programs
about the AIDS epidemic and breast cancer. Programs about child-
birth may also become an issue now that we have the nudity provi-
sion. There is a real threat to speech here, and the greatest threat
is to speech that is not favored by the big media conglomerates.
The recent mergers taking place in telecommunications were
discussed in the first panel today.74 Disney and Microsoft may be
two of the companies that survive. Will these mergers result in
these corporations determining who gets to speak? Will there be
any basis for some kind of public discourse? Will that discourse
be so bland that people cannot express themselves in ways they
believe are, effective for presenting their views?
PROF. FRANZESE: Thank you, Mr. Horwood. I think that
we would all agree that Mr. Horwood's presentation and points,
particularly the questions that he raised most recently are very
72. See, e.g., Erznozik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 213 (1975).
73. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, 47 C.F.R.
§ 76.701(a); see also Alliance For Community Media v. FCC, 10 F.3d 812, 815-816
(1993).
74. See Panel I, supra note 22.
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compelling. I think they are important notions for us to return to.
It is now my pleasure to present Professor Robert Perry.
PROF. PERRY: I will address the public forum status of pub-
lic access channels. This is an issue that has received relatively
limited focus throughout this three-year litigation, in large measure
because it was the alternative state action argument. 75 Neverthe-
less, it is of great importance, not only in the Alliance litigation,
but also to public access producers who quite often face censorship
by cable operators, in situations where the government is not di-
rectly involved in encouraging or compelling that censorship. In
those situations, the public access producer's best argument for
constitutional scrutiny of cable operator's censorship is that public
access channels are a public forum. The public forum status of
public access channels is not only important for public access pro-
ducers, but it is also important for poorly financed speakers in
cyberspace whose marginalized expression is suppressed by osten-
sibly private actions. The outcome of this case will possibly add
a new gloss to the problematic public forum doctrine insofar as it
clarifies the scope of the doctrine's application in cyberspace.76
This is an issue I've been litigating since the 1980s, including
in the Missouri Knights77 case, which I discussed on this panel two
years ago.78 Most recently, I have worked on cases involving
Glendora, the public access producer who files public interest pro
se litigation and then does public access shows about the litiga-
tion.7 9
The en banc majority in the D.C. Circuit in the Alliance case
concluded that public access channels are not public fora because,
75. See Alliance, 10 F.3d 812 (1993).
76. See generally David J. Goldstone, The Public Forum Doctrine in the Age of the
Information Superhighway, 46 HASTiNGS L.J. 335 (1995).
77. Missouri Knights of the Klu Klux Klan v. Kansas City, Mo., 723 F. Supp. 1347
(W.D. Mo. 1989).
78. See Symposium, First Amendment and the Media: Current Issues in Telecommu-
nications Law and Cable Television, 4 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 801, 827-
836 (1994) [hereinafter Symposium].
79. See Glendora v. Cablevision Systems Corp., 45 F.3d 36 (2d Cir. 1995), on
remand, 893 F. Supp. 264 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
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in the en banc majority's view, the public forum doctrine is appli-
cable only when speakers seek access to government property and
public access channels are private property.80
I submitted a brief on behalf of the New York City public ac-
cess producers, the third group of petitioners in the Supreme Court
who were intervenors in the D.C. Circuit that focused solely on the
public forum doctrine.81 The brief was written almost in the form
of an amicus curiae brief, by my colleague, Brian Graifman, a
former student of mine at New York Law School who has worked
with me in the Glendora litigation, and myself. We challenged
both the major and minor premises of the en banc majority.
The en banc majority's minor premise was that public access
channels are private property.82 We argued, to the contrary, that
public access channels are public property. 3 We contended that
during the cable franchising process, the public obtains an easement
in these channels as a quid pro quo for the grant to cable operators
of private easements to continuously occupy public rights of way.84
The cable franchising process is thus not unlike the subdivision
development process when developers, in order to gain zoning
approval, zoning variances, or subdivision plot approval, dedicate
some of their private land for public purposes.8 5 Many parks and
streets are created in this way. Private property becomes, at the
very least, subject to a public easement.8 6 If the dedication is done
formally, pursuant to state statute, fee title is actually transferred to
the public. But even if it is done under the so-called common
law method of dedication, the public obtains an easement, which
is a form of public property interest.88
80. Alliance, 56 F.3d at 121-23.
81. Brief for New York City Petitioners, Alliance for Community Media v. FCC, 56
F.3d 105 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (No. 95-227) [hereinafter Brief for New York City Petitioners].
82. Alliance, 56 F.3d at 122.
83. Brief for New York City Petitioners at 11-15.
84. Id. at 11.
85. Id. at 12-13.
86. Id. at 13.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 13-14.
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Similarly we argued that public access channels are subject, at.
the very least, to a public easement, and perhaps even transfer of
fee title through the franchise process.89 The public property inter-
est in public access channels is also confirmed by the tradition of
denying cable operators editorial control in those channels.
Another factor points to public property ownership in public
access channels. Among the bundle of rights that property owners
have is the right to exclude third parties from using their property. 9°
Cable operators, by franchise agreements and by state and federal
law, have long been barred from exercising any editorial control
over public access channels,9" at least prior to the 1992 amend-
ments.92 That denial of editorial control suggests very strongly that
cable operators do not hold all the property interests in public ac-
cess channels.
Our brief for the New York City Petitioners also challenged the
major assumption of the en banc majority, to wit, the premise that
the public forum doctrine only applies when speakers seek access
to government property.93 We pointed out that there are at least
eight Supreme Court decisions dating back to Hague v. CIO,94 the
seminal Public Forum doctrine decision from 1939, which recog-
nize either explicitly or implicitly the application of public forum
analysis to private property dedicated by government to public
use.95 For example, there was the Greenburgh case from 1981
involving the status of private mailboxes. While the Supreme
Court concluded that such receptacles were not a public fora, it
nevertheless recognized that they were part of the interstate system
89. id. at 14.
90. See id. at 14-15.
91. N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 229 (McKinney Supp. 1996) (enacted Jan. 1, 1996, for-
merly N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 829 (McKinney 1982)); 47 U.S.C. § 531(e).
92. Pub. L. No. 102-385, § 10(c), 106 Stat. 1460, 1486 (1992).
93. See generally Brief for New York City Petitioners.
94. See also Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788
(1985); Members of City Council of City of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466
U.S. 789 (1984); Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
95. See Brief for New York City Petitioners at 15-19.
96. United States Postal Service v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'n, 453 U.S. 114
(1981).
[Vol. 6:465
SYMPOSIUM-PANEL ON ACCESS CHANNELS
for distribution of the mail.97 Thus, even though the mailboxes
were private property, they were part of a government forum. Had
there been a tradition of public access to private mailboxes, the
Court might have ruled that such privately owned receptacles were
public fora.
The Pruneyard v. Robins98 case from 1980 involved Califor-
nia's free speech guarantee, which had been interpreted to create
a right of access for limited expression to private shopping cen-
ters.99 Although Pruneyard was primarily a 14th Amendment case,
the language of both the majority opinions and concurrence strong-
ly suggested that California's free speech guarantee had created
public fora on private property.
Even the seminal Public Forum decision-Hague v. Committee
for Industrial Organization 1---states that regardless of where title
to parks and streets lie, they are public fora.' °1 That dictum strong-
ly suggests that title is not dispositive of public forum analysis.
Moreover, the Court's 1985 decision in Cornelius v. NACCP10 2
expressly stated that the public forum doctrine applies to private
property dedicated by government to public use.' °3
There is, however, language in one Supreme Court decision to
the contrary. In the 1992 Lee'14 case, involving the airport termi-
nals in the Metropolitan New York City area, the majority rejected
the proffered analogy of airports as compared to bus and rail termi-
nals. The majority observed that the latter were privately owned
in most instances and thus suggested that public forum analysis
was inapposite. 0 5 But that observation was mere dicta because the
case concerned publicly owned airport terminals. Moreover, the
97. Id. at 128.
98. Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
99. id. at 81.
100. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
101. Id. at 515.
102. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
103. Id. at 801.
104. International Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701
(1992).
105. Id. at 2707.
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majority's observation ignored all of the other cases I mentioned
in which the Supreme Court recognized that private property dedi-
cated to public use may become public fora.
Finally, we pointed out something to which I must credit Mi-
chael Isenman, who is one of the principal authors of the Alliance
brief. He made a suggestion in passing a couple of years ago that
none of us ever followed up on until I did so a few months ago.
Do you know, who owns sidewalks and streets-the quintessen-
tial public fora? It turns out that sidewalks and streets are in large
measure privately owned. The fee title to the middle of the street,
including the sidewalk, in most instances is owned by the abutting
property owner.1 °6 If privately owned sidewalks and streets are
public fora, then public fora analysis clearly applies to private
property dedicated by government for public use.
Finally, as between the traditional public forum and designated
public forum category, we argued that public access channels fell
into the traditional category."°7
If all we get is a ruling that public access channels are desig-
nated public forum, that may in the long run prove a pyrrhic victo-
ry. The Supreme Court has made clear that designated public fo-
rums can be closed at any time and that, short of closing, they can
be collapsed by narrowing the subjects and the class of speakers
for which such fora are available.
By contrast, traditional public forum are subject to far greater
free speech protection.108 The closing of traditional public fora is
presumptively unconstitutional. Likewise, content regulation in
traditional public fora is subject to strict scrutiny. We argued that
public access channels are traditional public fora, even though they
have not been around from time immemorial, since from their in-
ception public access channels have had a tradition of public ex-
pression.' °9
106. See Brief for New York City Petitioners at 18-19.
107. See id. at 19-22.
108. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. 799-800.
109. Brief for New York City Petitioners at 20-21.
[Vol. 6:465
SYMPOSIUM-PANEL ON ACCESS CHANNELS
We also pointed out that, contrary to the famous dicta in Hague
v. CIO, at least one category of quintessential public fora-public
parks-have not been held in trust from time immemorial for pub-
lic expression."0 Indeed, public parks did not exist until the begin-
ning of the 19th century. Arguably, therefore, public expression in
public parks is merely a matter of recent convention, like public
expression on public access channels.
That concludes my comments. Thank you.
PROF. FRANZESE: Thank you, Professor Perry. I'm happy
to introduce now, Ms. Marjorie Heins. Ms. Heins is the counsel
as well as the director for the ACLU Arts Censorship Project.
MS. HEINS: Thank you. I'm going to try to give you a quick
guided tour through the mysterious world of indecency law. As
you have already heard, this concept of "indecency" drives not only
Section 10 of the 1992 Cable Act,"' on which the Supreme Court
will rule this term, but an increasing amount of other legislation
including, most recently, the Communications Decency Act of
1996,12 which President Clinton is about to sign.
Where did it all come from? We have to go back to the early
days of what we would now call obscenity legislation or legislation
designed to suppress and punish speech about sex. The origins of
both obscenity and indecency law in the United States certainly go
back to the 19th century in and the Comstock Act," 3 the brainchild
of Anthony Comstock, who was director of the New York Society
for the Suppression of Vice. 1 4 At the federal level, these 19th
century statutes tended to have a laundry list of adjectives.' They
would prohibit "obscene," "lewd," "lascivious," "filthy," "vile," or
"indecent" speech, sent through the mails, through interstate travel,
through importation from abroad, and more recently through broad-
110. Id. at 19-20 n.16.
111. 1992 Act § 10, 47 U.S.C. § 532.
112. Communications Decency Act of 1996, Title V of the Telecommunications Act
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (to be codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 47 U.S.C.).
113. See 18 U.S.C §§ 1461-1465 (1994).
114. For more on Comstock, see MARJORIE HEINS, SEx, SIN AND BLASPHEMY: A GUIDE
TO AMERICA'S CENSORSHIP WARS 19, 27-28 (1993).
115. 18 U.S.C §§ 1461-1465.
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casting.11
6
When the Supreme Court started looking at these laws, the first
thing it said was that yes, you can have an obscenity exception to
the First Amendment, even though the First Amendment talks
about freedom of speech with no exceptions." 7 In 1957, the Court
said in Roth v. United States,118 that generally, speech about sex is
constitutionally protected. 19 This is a subject of great interest to
humankind and fully constitutionally protected. There is, however,
a subcategory of speech about sex that, according to the Court in
Roth, is not an "essential part of any exposition of ideas."' 120 That
speech simply appeals to the "prurient interest" and has no "re-
deeming social importance."' 2' This kind of speech, so-called ob-
scenity, can be punished.
Of course, the Court has ever since tried to define exactly
where the line between obscenity and constitutionally protected
speech about sex is. In a subsequent case, the Court admitted there
was only a dim and uncertain line between most speech about sex-
uality, which is constitutionally protected, and prohibit obscenity. 
122
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has ruled that the federal govern-
ment and the states can punish and prohibit this category called
obscenity. 123
Now what did the Court do with these laundry list statutes? In
a number of cases, the Court said that all these terms are essential-
ly synonyms for obscenity-that is, a category of speech about sex
that is not part of the exposition of ideas and therefore punish-
able. 124 Reading these laundry lists as synonyms was constitution-
116. 18 U.S.C § 1464, relating to broadcasting, does not include "lewd," "lascivi-
ous," "filthy," or "vile," but prohibits "obscene, indecent or profane language by means
of radio communication."
117. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
118. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
119. Id. at 487.
120. Id. at 484-85 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572
(1942)).
121. Id.
122. Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 66 (1963).
123. Roth, 354 U.S. at 492-94.
124. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117-19 (1973); United States v. 12
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ally required because, as the Court had already established, non-
obscene speech about sex is constitutionally protected and cannot
be punished.
Thus, whether you call it lewd, lascivious, indecent, or filthy,
it all really means obscene. Any other result would be unconstitu-
tional; that is, it would permit Congress to punish constitutionally
protected speech. That was the law until 1978 when a bizarre case
called FCC v. Pacifica Foundation'25 was decided.
Pacifica is about a radio broadcast of the famous "seven filthy
words" monologue by the comedian George Carlin. Carlin's
monologue was a political satirical statement about our taboos
about four-letter words, and he repetitively uses these four-letter
words in what is really a hilarious comic sketch in order to drive
home his point. If you want a good laugh, I recommend that you
go to the U.S. Reports and read the appendix of the Pacifica deci-
sion which sets out the monologue in full. 126
The FCC, however, did not appreciate the broadcast of Carlin's
monologue in the mid-afternoon when children might be listening,
and neither did a majority of the Supreme Court. In a plurality
decision, a five-to-four majority with no opinion commanding the
votes of five justices, the Supreme Court in Pacifica upheld the
FCC's decision to sanction Pacifica radio under its indecency regu-
lations for broadcasting the Carlin monologue at an hour when
children would be likely to hear it. 127
One of the federal statutes, as I mentioned, prohibited obscene,
profane, or indecent radio communications.128 The FCC, of course,
has regulatory power over broadcasting.1 29 This is because the
broadcast spectrum frequencies are limited. There has to be some
licensing so that people do not have cacophony and competition
over the same frequencies. 130 That was the original justification for
200-Foot Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123, 130 n.7 (1973).
125. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
126. Id. at 751.
127. Id. at 732.
128. 18 U.S.C. § 1464.
129. 47 U.S.C. § 151.
130. See Red Lion v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 376 (1969); Pacifica 438 U.S. at 741-42
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licensing of broadcast communications, a government practice that
would not be permitted with respect to the print media, for exam-
ple, where there is no frequency/cacophony problem.
The FCC, however, went beyond simply licensing content; it
wanted to control it. The agency interpreted this particular federal
statute as going beyond obscenity and beyond what the Supreme
Court said was\' pot protected by the First Amendment. The FCC
gave a separate definition for indecency which was one of the laun-
dry list of words that had been interpreted in other similar statutes
as simply a redundancy of obscenity.'
The definition the FCC used was the "patently offensive ac-
cording to contemporary community standards" prong of the Su-
preme Court's three-part obscenity test, as articulated in 1973 in
Miller v. California.132  After Roth, the Supreme Court went
through a period of trying to figure out what the definition of ob-
scenity would be and it shifted back and forth.'33 Finally, in 1973,
the Court in Miller set out this three-part test, 34 which most of you
may know.
The government, in order to prove that material is constitution-
ally obscene and unprotected, has to prove all three parts of this
test. First, the government must prove that the material, taken as
a whole, lacks any serious literary, artistic, political or scientific
value-the so-called "SLAPS" test."35 Second, the material, taken
as a whole, must appeal to a prurient interest, which has subse-
quently been defined as a morbid or shameful, rather than a healthy
interest in sexuality. 136  Lastly, the material must depict sexual
activities or organs as specifically enumerated under state law in a
manner that is patently offensive according to contemporary com-
n.17.
131. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 731-32.
132. 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). For articulation of the Miller standard see supra note
40.
133. See, e.g., Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967); Memoirs v. Massachusetts,
383 U.S. 413 (1966).
134. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
135. Id.
136. See Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, 472 U.S. 491, 504 (1985).
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munity standards. 37 In Miller, the Court said, this "patently offen-
sive" prong is .determined by local standards because the country
is too vast for there to be any identifiable national community
standard of patent offensiveness. 3
8
The "patently offensive" prong of the Miller test was bizarre
from the very beginning. The Court has consistently said, in other
contexts not related to this terrible subject of sex that seems to give
American society so much nervousness, that offensiveness cannot
be a standard for censoring speech. 39 Quite to the contrary, the
First Amendment is all about protecting the speech of minorities,
the speech of dissenters, unpopular speech, and provocative speech.
The Court has said, for example, in cases involving racist
speech and the most offensive kinds of deplorable ideas, that the
First Amendment protects against majoritarian suppression of pre-
cisely those types of offensive speech."4 But when it comes to
sex, the Supreme Court has failed not only to make that connection
and see that you cannot start having censorship standards based on
offensiveness; the Court has itself articulated an offensiveness stan-
dard which is a community standard, completely contrary to the
most fundamental notions of what the First Amendment is all
about.
So the Miller decision started us down the road of permitting
censorship based on "community standards" of "patent offensive-
ness." The FCC took the "patently offensive" prong of Miller and
said, for purposes of broadcasting-the content of which we can
control much more than any other medium-we are going to re-
quire time channeling of all "indecent" language.' 4' This will pre-
137. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
138. Id. at 32.
139. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 409 (1989); Hustler Magazine v.
Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55-56 (1988).
140. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992); Terminiello v. Chica-
go, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
141. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 727. The Supreme Court has never expressly ruled that
"indecent speech" with respect to minors is constitutionally unprotected. Instead, it has
held that the obscenity standard may be modified to permit government to ban dissemina-
tion to minors of a broader range of material than the adult obscenity standard would
permit. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 638 (1968). Appellate courts have adjust-
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vent broadcasting when minors are likely to be listening. We are
not going to limit ourselves to obscenity by interpreting "indecent".
to mean "obscene."
As Jim may have mentioned, this is not an absolute ban, but it
is to "protect" children from indecent speech, which we acknowl-
edge is constitutionally protected for adults. It does not satisfy the
other two prongs of Miller. It can have serious literary value;
indeed it can be the greatest masterpiece in the world. But if it is
"patently offensive" and has to do with sex or excretory activities
or organs, we can require time channeling, and we can punish com-
panies that broadcast such speech during times when children are
likely to be listening.142  We can threaten to deny them license
renewal, fine them, and sanction them if they broadcast what we
consider to be patently offensive sexual subject matter during all
except late night hours.
1 43
Pacifica upheld the FCC's approach, at least as applied to the
Carlin monologue. The Court rejected the argument that "inde-
cent" for purposes of federal broadcasting must constitutionally be
interpreted to mean "obscene." The Court never addressed the
ed the pre-Miller "harmful to minors" or "obscene as to minors" test articulated in
Ginsberg to conform to the tripartite Miller definition of obscenity. See American Book-
sellers Ass'n v. Webb, 919 F.2d 1493, 1503 n.18 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S.
941 (1991); American Booksellers Ass'n v. Virginia, 882 F.2d 125, 127 n.2 (4th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1056 (1990). The Ginsberg modification of the adult
obscenity standard thus represents the constitutional limits of government's ability to ban
dissemination of speech on sexual subjects to minors. Despite Pacifica, the Court has
never said that government may wholly ban communications to minors that are encom-
passed by the much broader concept of "indecency," which, unlike the "harmful to mi-
nors" test, includes material that may have "serious value" and lack any "prurience." The
government has asked the Court to do this in the Alliance case and in its defense of a
constitutional challenge to the 1996 Communications Decency Act. See American Civil
Liberties Union v. Reno, 24 Media L. Rep. 1379 (1996).
142. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 732.
143. Id. at 736. At the time of Pacifica, the "patently offensive" standard referred
only to language, i.e., common four-letter words, and thus was relatively easy to apply.
In 1987, under political pressure, the FCC expanded its application of the broad and
vague concept of "patent offensiveness" from specific words referring to "sexual or
excretory activities or organs" to any sexual subject matter it considered offensive, includ-
ing serious literary works, double entendres, and innuendo. See Action for Children's
Television v. FCC, 852 F.2d 1332, 337-38 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
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question of whether this patent offensiveness standard meets the
constitutional requirements of specificity, or, in other words, wheth-
er it is unconstitutionally vague. That, of course, is a major issue
in the Alliance case that the Court will hear in a few weeks.1"
One saving grace of the Pacifica decision is that, at the time,
the FCC was relatively specific that it was talking about words. If
you ever went into a Pacifica station in the days after the Pacifica
decision, you would see signs in the studio that said essentially:
thou shalt not say the following seven words over the air or we're
going to get in trouble. They were your typical Anglo-Saxon 4-
letter or 10-letter or 12-letter words. Thus, broadcasters knew they
could address sexual subject matter. They could have music that
was about sexuality. They could have humor. They simply had to
stay away from these naughty words, because somehow they would
harm children. But when the FCC expanded its application of its
indecency rule to anything that it considered offensive, not just a
list of dirty words, the standard became vague and freewheeling,
subject to the shifting sensibilities and moral standards of FCC
commissioners.
Pacifica opened a Pandora's box in at least two ways. The first
was when the FCC in the late 1980s decided greatly to expand
application of its indecency standard, it could rely on Pacifica's
apparent approval of a "patent offensiveness" test for legal justifi-
cation. 45 The second was that, as the Alliance case, and the 1996
Act demonstrate, Pacifica opened the door to regulation of speech
about sexuality that does not meet the obscenity test. This has
led-especially with the rise of religious fundamentalism and the
right wing tilt in this country-to the culture wars, the increased
sex panic that some of our sociologists have observed, and a real
orgy of "indecency" legislation.1 46 Congress loves it. Congress
can now use this indecency standard, or thinks it can, to go well
beyond the "harmful to minors" standard upheld in Ginsberg v.
144. See generally Brief for the Federal Respondents.
145. See Action for Children's Television, 852 F.2d at 134.
146. See, e.g., 1996 Act, 47 U.S.C. § 223.
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New York, 147 and well beyond the time channeling of "filthy words"
approved in Pacifica. Congress has thus used the "indecency"
standard to regulate dial-a-por, 48 cable, 149 and now the Internet. 50
Let me explain the expansion point just for a minute. Under
political pressure, which has been well-documented in a number of
interesting law review articles,1 5 the FCC by 1987 decided it was
going to interpret indecency to go beyond the "filthy" words to
anything that it considered patently offensive. That would include
double entendre, sexual innuendo and really anything that they
were offended by. 52
So, by the late 1980s and early 1990s, the stations that carried
Howard Stem, for example, were getting into a lot of trouble. This
is because even if Stem did not use any of these seven words, he
certainly had a lot of innuendo, and the FCC thought it was offen-
sive. ' 3 In three cases where the FCC imposed sanctions in the late
1980s, a coalition of broadcasters and free speech groups chal-
lenged the agency's expanded interpretation of indecency.
54
Among other things, the challenge specifically asserted that the
indecency standard was unconstitutionally vague. The D.C. Circuit
in the first of those cases, in a decision written by now Associate
Justice Ruth Ginsberg said, we think the Pacifica decision by infer-
147. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
148. Dial Info. Serv. Corp. of N.Y. v. Thornburgh, 938 F.2d 1535 (2d Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1076 (1992); Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S.
115 (1989).
149. 47 U.S.C. § 561(a).
150. S. REP. No. 652, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. § 509 (1996).
151. E.g., Lili Levi, The Hard Case of Broadcast Indecency, 20 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 49 (1992-93); R.G. Passler, Comment, Regulation of Indecent Radio Broad-
casts: George Carlin Revisited-What Does the Future Hold for the Seven "Dirty" Words,
65 TUL. L. REV. 131 (1990); William Banks Wilhelm, Jr., Note, In the Interest of Chil-
dren: Action for Children's Television v. FCC Improperly Delineating the Constitutional
Limits of Broadcast Indecency Regulation, 42 CATH. U. L. REV. 215 (1992).
152. See Levi, supra note 151, at 49.
153. See, e.g., Jeffrey Yorke, Locking on the Shock Jocks, WASH. POST, Aug. 18,
1992, at D7; James Warren, WLUP Wants To See FCC In Court, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 11.
1991, at C2; Lee E. Sheehy & Linda S. Friedner, FCC Intensifies Its Crackdown on
"Indecent" Radio Broadcasts, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 29, 1990 at 15; Claudia Phig, FCC Tests
Ability to Ban Speech, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 26, 1989, Part 5, at 1.
154. See Action for Children's Television, 852 F.2d 1332.
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ence held the FCC's indecency definition-patently offensive by
contemporary community standards-not to be vague, but if we're
wrong, we welcome correction from "Higher Authority." '55 She
put the "Higher Authority" in capital letters to indicate with a
touch of irony that she is talking about something like God.
Well, she is now, of course, a member of that "Higher Authori-
ty"; she's now an associate god, so we are hoping she will reach
the vagueness issue in the Alliance case.
The cases challenging the 1987 expansion of the FCC's inde-
cency enforcement were actually partial wins, although not on the
vagueness issue. The D.C. Circuit did rule that the FCC had not
shown that the specific time channeling regulations that it was
imposing were justified by empirical facts reflecting the presence
of minors in the audience during the broad swath of time when the
FCC said "indecency" could not be aired. The court sent the agen-
cy's time-channeling finding.156 But regarding the merits of the
challenge to the use of the indecency standard as a burdensome
regulation of what is clearly constitutionally protected speech that
may have great literary or artistic value or other value, the D.C.
Circuit felt it was bound by the Pacifica decision.'57
As for the second effect of Pacifica, the use of "indecency" as
a censorship standard outside the broadcast context, I'll try to touch
on just a few points. As I mentioned, although the Supreme Court
has said in a number of cases that Pacifica is an emphatically nar-
row decision, strictly limited to the broadcast context,158 Congress
continues to rely on it. The Department of Justice ("DOJ") similar-
ly relies very heavily on Pacifica in its brief in the Alliance case. 51
One of the most deplorable things about the Pacifica plurality deci-
sion is that it talks about speech on sexual subjects, or "patently
offensive" use of four-letter words, as speech that has very little
155. Id. at 1339.
156. Id. at 1332.
157. Id. at 1339.
158. Sable, 492 U.S. at 127.
159. See Brief for Federal Respondents at 46.
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First Amendment value.16 The government picks up on that and
in its Alliance brief urges the Supreme Court to announce a very
lenient standard of scrutiny for restrictions on "indecen-
cy"-certainly not the strict scrutiny ordinarily required of content-
based restrictions on speech.161 Not even the intermediate O'Brien
scrutiny162 that Jim mentioned, but a very lenient reasonableness
standard of scrutiny for content-based regulation, where the content
in question is indecency, because according to the government, it
is not very high value First Amendment speech.
The government's brief, of course, ignores the fact that sexuali-
ty is a political subject in this country, and political speech has
always been on the highest rung of constitutional protection as the
Supreme Court has said this many times. 163
The 1992 Act which is challenged in the Alliance case uses the
FCC's "patently offensive" indecency definition to do a couple of
things. First, section 10(a) of the 1992 Act enables cable operators
to censor a particular category of communication, defined by Con-
gress, that Congress does not like. This category of so-called inde-
cency or what the cable operator "reasonably believes" is indecent
may be censored, but only on these access channels, which as Bob
Perry pointed out, have been traditionally viewed as public fora
where the cable operator acts simply as a conduit for the speech of
the community.
So in addition to the vagueness problems inherent in terms like
"patent offensiveness" and "contemporary community standards,"
we have an additional level of vagueness in that the cable operator
may now censor anything it "reasonably believes" would be patent-
ly offensive according to community standards." 4
Additionally, the 1992 Act is replete with self-certification
requirements that, as the Supreme Court has recognized in the
160. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 746.
161. See Brief'for Federal Respondents at 29-32.
162. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968).
163. See, e.g., NAACP v. Clairbome Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982);
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1976).
164. 47 U.S.C. § 532(h).
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related context of loyalty oaths, 165 have a natural chilling effect or
a self censorship effect.16 If you, cable programmer, are required
to certify that your programming is not indecent, you are going to
steer far away and self-censor in order to make sure that the gov-
ernment, or in this case, the cable operator, does not disagree with/
your judgment because the penalties under the 1992 Act are pretty
draconian.1 67 If you are a cable programmer and guess wrong
about what the operator "reasonably believes" is patently offensive,
you can get kicked off the air. So the certification is an additional
problem.
Ever since the Miller decision,1 68 which in a sense is the source
of all these woes, this concept of indecency has been a growing
threat to freedom of speech in the very important area of human
sexuality, related areas of gay and lesbian rights, censorship, and
safe sex information. Until our nation is able to face up to this
schizophrenic fear it has of speech about sex, and the correspond-
ing standards of "offensiveness" that the courts have permitted as
a censorship standard, we are going to be facing continuing threats
to our freedom.
PROF. FRANZESE: Thank you, great. I'd like to introduce
now, Mr. Stuart Gold.
MR. GOLD: Yes, I am the one person who may not have been
happy about the granting of certiorari in the Alliance case. How-
ever, if the Supreme Court grants my motion to give me ten min-
utes to argue, I might change my opinion about that.
I represent Time Warner which manages and operates the cable
systems in Manhattan, as well as several other boroughs in New
York City, and across the country. Some of the questions that we
are talking about here, with a more New York-based flavor, are
why shouldn't Al Goldstein and Robin Byrd be able to put on
sexually explicit programming on Time Warner Cable of New York
165. See Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513
(1958).
166. 1992 Act § 10(a)-(d); 47 U.S.C. 532(h), 532(j), 531, 558.
167. 47 U.S.C. § 532(h).
168. Miller, 413 U.S. at 15.
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City's cable systems? Aren't their First Amendment rights being
subjected to odious censorship? Why should Time Warner be able
to put on and sell "The Smart-ass Delinquent," and convince me to
buy Screw magazine at the same time, while refusing Al Goldstein
the right to show excerpts of the hardcore version of that same
movie? Why should the government have any business regulating
indecent programming as opposed to obscene programming?
Some of the answers may come with the Alliance case, but then
again, maybe not because by the time we got to the 1992 Act, we
were already hopelessly in an Alice in Wonderland world. Last
night, I reread the 1996 Act, and it seems like the next round of
litigation over indecent speech on cable is about to start before the
curtain has been brought down on the first round of litigation.
Now the cable industry is often accused of wrapping itself too
tightly in the First Amendment. But the Supreme Court from Mid-
west Video 169 in 1979 to the Turner170 case in 1994, has made it
clear that cable operators are publishers engaged in editorial activi-
ties, and that cable operators' programming choices are fully enti-
tled to protection under the First Amendment.'
7
'
While the cable operators have a First Amendment garment in
which to wrap themselves, the leased access programmers, certainly
of indecent fare, are sporting the emperor's new clothes. While
leased access programmers certainly do have First Amendment
rights to speak, and speak indecently if they choose, they do not
have First Amendment rights to access my client's cable system
anymore than I can demand CNN to give me the slot that they
have Larry King in so I can tap dance naked if I want.
Cable access is a statutory right that was granted by Congress
in derogation of cable operators' First Amendment rights to make
their own programming choices. 72 To understand what is happen-
ing in the Alliance case, you really have to back up to the 1984
169. FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979).
170. Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994).
171. Midwest Video, 440 U.S. at 707; Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2458.
172. 47 U.S.C. § 532.
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Act.173 It is the 1984 Act where Congress took 10 percent to 15
percent of a cable operator's channels and gave them to leased
access programmers. 74 On those channels, a cable operator cannot
put anybody on who is affiliated with it. These channels have to
be openly available for leasing by programmers, and cable opera-
tors have no editorial control over these channels. Additionally, an
unlimited percent of your capacity can be taken for public access
programming by local franchise authorities as part of the price of
gaining the franchise.
On public access channels, cable operators also do not exercise
any editorial control, whether or not the franchising authority
would give it any. This does not make any sense, because diversi-
ty of programming has never been a problem on any reasonably
large cable system. You may not like anything that is on the 75
channels in New York, but it is diverse. I would take issue with
anybody who says that there is not a diversity of programming on
those channels, as was there before public access and before lease
access.
While leased access and public access requirements are conced-
edly infringing the cable operator's First Amendment rights-we
do challenge the concept of leased access and public access, and
Congress' right to insist on that access-this issue has split the
lower courts. The Supreme Court has not yet decided. The most
recent decision by Judge Jackson in the D.C. District Court upheld
leased access and public access as constitutional.1 75 This was ar-
gued in the D.C. Circuit in November 1995, and a decision on that
will come.
But even putting that to one side, it is a strange result, since
Justice Kennedy in Lee seemed to agree that the First Amendment
does not grant powers to Congress. 76 The First Amendment does
not empower Congress to legislate, even in the name of diversity.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Daniels Cablevision, Inc. v. United States, 835 F.Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1993), appeal
pending sub noma. Time Warner Entertainment Co. v. FCC, 56 F.3d 151 (D.C. Cir. 1995),
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 911 (1996).
176. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2716.
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It limits their power. I came in on Bob Joffe's talk where he was
echoing many of these same comments.17 7 I do have one visual
aid. It is a cartoon from, I believe it is the Daily News, that came
out during a litigation that I've been involved in with Mr.
Goldstein, Robin Byrd, and Ms. Heins who represents them in that
case. They are wrapping themselves in the First Amendment, but
as this makes clear, what they're wearing says, "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of or abridging the free-
dom of speech." They shall make no law.
Now the First Amendment may posit diversity as a value, but
it achieves that value by forbidding government action, not by
authorizing such action. But towards an obligation of full disclo-
sure, I must say that although I rely on Justice Kennedy's state-
ment, he happens to have written the plurality opinion upholding
the "must-carry" law which requires cable operators, as opposed to
cable programmers, to give away up to one-third or more of their
capacity for broadcast stations. 178 Therefore, I am not sure where
the Supreme Court goes as to the language of the First Amend-
ment.
In 1992, Congress realized that one unexpected result of having
taken all this capacity and prohibiting the cable operator from exer-
cising editorial control was that there was a deluge on some sys-
tems of sexually explicit material. 179 There was a lot of hardcore
pornography usually kept just on the line between indecency and
obscenity.
Many of the programmers, certainly in New York, love to play
a game where they sneak obscene material into their programs to
see whether the cable operator is screening or not, and whether
they can get away with it. Even when they get caught, some of
you who watch that may know about the famous blue dot that
seems to jump around the screen to block certain material that
might make what is on the screen obscene as opposed to indecent.
Congress' solution for the most part was to pass section 10
177. See Panel I, supra note 22.
178. See Turner, 114 S.Ct. at 2445.
179. See 138 CONG. REC. §§ 646-49 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1992).
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which gives back to the cable operator the right to promulgate a
policy-this is section 10(a)-prohibiting or somehow restricting
indecent programming on leased access. 80 Those cable operators
that do not have such a policy must then adhere to the blocking
and access requirement of section 10(b)'81 and the regulations
thereunder if they maintain indecent programming on leased access.
Subscribers must request that the channel be unblocked.
As you have heard, section 10 also says that the FCC should
pass some regulations that allow the cable operator to prevent such
programming on public access if the operator chooses. 82 It then
removes the immunity granted to cable operators, something that
we are challenging ourselves, section 10(d).' 83 This is because it
is bizarre that Congress can tell you to deal with these people and
take their programming, but if you allow them to put on obscene
programming, you may pay a price by being prosecuted for it.
In New York, Time Warner Cable actually announced a policy
on leased access programming. 84 It did not prohibit indecent pro-
gramming, as it had the right to under section 10(a). 185 In fact, a
lot of subscribers desire to have access to this kind of program-
ming.186 Also, leased access programmers, as opposed to public
access programmers, pay for the time they use. This also generates
revenue for the cable system. This policy said that on leased ac-
cess, indecent programming was going to be programmed relatively
late at night and in the early morning hours, generally 10:00 p.m.
to 6:00 a.m. It is also scrambled, which hneans you cannot view
it, unless a signal comes to your converter box to tell the equip-
ment to unscramble the signal.
Channel 35 in New York is where most of the indecent leased
180. 1992 Act § 10(a), 47 U.S.C. § 532(h).
181. Id. § 10(b), 47 U.S.C. § 5320).
182. Id. § 10(c), 47 U.S.C; § 531.
183. Id. § 10(d), 47 U.S.C. § 558.
184. Rich Brown, Fans of Blue Fare Speak Up; Manhattan Cable Say Twenty Per-
cent of Its Subs Have Requested Leased-Access Sex Channels, 125 BROADCASTING & CABLE
46 (1995).
185. Id.
186. Id.
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access programming is, but that channel also has a substantial
amount of non-indecent programming. Because of this, Time
Warner really did not want to scramble the whole signal, so it
would be scrambled during those hours where there was indecent
programming. If you desired to have it unscrambled, you were
asked to respond to a mailing by sending back a preprinted card
stating the subscriber's name, account number, that he or she is
over 18, and that he or she desires access to all channel 35 pro-
gramming. There was no indication on the card that you wanted
indecent programming. Over 50,000 subscribers, including myself,
sent back the card saying, we want all the programming." 7
Some argue that this return card is odious because it brands
you, i.e. most people won't send it in because it will brand you as
either a porno consumer or a pervert. I think that is really a gross
overstatement, given that over 50,000 people sent those cards in.
Every time you order an adult movie on a cable system, or sub-
scribe to a channel that might have indecent material, there is a
record made. It has to be kept private by law,188 and it does show
up on your bill. If you go today into most video stores, the X-
rated section of the neighborhood video store-not the XXX
ones-most of them are usually out. You can see your neighbors
renting the cassettes. I do not think there is anything to the notion
that this card really constrains the audience.
Nonetheless, Al Goldstein, after making several statements that
maybe he denies making, the Village Voice and the Daily News all
quoted him as saying that he thought this was a good policy be-
cause "Time Warner has solved the kids problem for us. so that no
one can accuse us of reaching kids."'189 He thought that this was
a good policy, because he wants hard core adult viewers, not kids.
Somehow between those statements and a month later, he did sue,
and the policy was enjoined.
187. See Sex Channels Scrambling Blocked, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 21, 1995, News, at 1
(reporting that 50,000 of 290,000 subscribers had returned their cards); Brown, supra note
184, 186, at 46 (reporting that 60,000 of 300,000 subscribers returned their cards).
188. 47 U.S.C. § 551(c).
189. Alex Michelin, Sex Show Fans Gotten Scramble?, DAILY NEWS, July 18, 1995,
at 6; Turn of the Screw Owner, VILLAGE VOICE, Aug. 15, 1995, at 38.
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Now the big issue, and what is wrong with this whole picture,
is that it is not the government who is censoring anybody. It is not
censorship. It is the cable operator getting back his or her right to
program their channels as they see fit. It is not censorship any-
more than if I run a movie theater and I do not want to show Oona
Z or Samantha Fox's latest flick. I say I won't show it. Congress
has given editorial discretion back to the cable operator. Anytime
that Congress is giving back a First Amendment right to a speaker,
it enhances First Amendment values, not restricts them. Keep in
mind that both the public and leased access programmers' right to
get on the systems is statutory,19° not constitutional.
Our position is that there is no need for the First Amendment
analysis of sections 10(a) and 10(c). 91 Section 10(a) returns to the
cable operator the right to make its own editorial decisions, which
are protected by the First Amendment. 92 If there is no state action,
there is no need for a First Amendment analysis. Some argue that
there really is state action because the government has set it up.
For instance, it is voluntary for leased access where section 10(a)
says you can have a policy. 93 If you do not have a policy, then
you must under section 10(b) segregate this material, block it, and
require the viewer to request access to it.' 94 There are some other
elements under section 10(b) that require blocking. 95 The pro-
grammer, to a large extent, may decide whether or not it thinks its
material is indecent.' %
So Judge Wald in her dissent in the D.C. Circuit said this is
really state action. 97 This is because section 10(b), which is cum-
bersome and may be expensive, coerces cable operators to choose
section 10(a) which requires censorship of material allowed under
section 10(b).
190. 47 U.S.C. § 531 (1994).
191. See Brief for Amicus Curiae Time Warner Cable at 7-20.
192. 1992 Act § 10(a), 47 U.S.C. § 532(b).
193. 1992 Act § 10(c), 47 U.S.C. § 532(b).
194. 1992 Act § 10(b), 47 U.S.C. § 532(j).
195. Id.
196. See id.
197. Alliance, 56 F.3d at 130-34 (Wald, J., dissenting).
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However, section 10(a) does not require a ban on such material.
The FCC has interpreted section 10(a) to allow a cable operator to
either ban it or put restrictions on it, as Time Warner chose to do.
Moreover, there are really four choices that a cable operator has on
leased access. You can issue a policy barring indecent program-
ming. You can issue a policy restricting, as Time Warner did,
indecent programming. You can move the programming off of
leased access to non-access channels. If you do that, you will have
total editorial control over those channels, except for the "must-
carry" channels.
A lot of times the answer to that is nobody is going to move
this stuff onto other channels. The Alliance petitioners in the Su-
preme Court, however, assert that there are many other indecent
materials on non-access channels that are not being regulated, so
by their own concession, there isn't a terrible reluctance on the part
of cable operators to program even indecent material under appro-
priate protections. 9 Most indecent material on non-access chan-
nels like Playboy and Showtime are scrambled, and you have to
order them specifically. They will put it on.
The real controversy arise because cable operators do not think
Al Goldstein's programming is that good, and they would prefer to
have the pay-per-view movies or Showtime than Al Goldstein. If
he was producing something that subscribers wanted in large num-
bers, maybe then they would get on non-access. The fourth option
is that through choice or inertia, you do not do any of those things,
and you leave indecent programming on, then you're subject to
section 10(b).
As to section 10(c), which is the public access section, the
cable operator has the decision whether to prohibit this material or
not. 199 There is a claim that these public access channels are public
fora.2°° But public access channels are not public fora, they are not
198. Brief for Petitioner Alliance at 41-43.
199. 1992 Act § 10(c), 47 U.S.C. 531.
200. Missouri Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Kansas City, 723 F. Supp. 1347, 1351
(W.D. Mo. 1989) (citing United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'n,
435 U.S. 114, 131 n.7 (1981)).
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public property, and I believe that the Supreme Court only supports
the public forum doctrine with respect to public property.
The channels that become public access channels and leased
access channels are not created as access channels. The cable
operator designates which channels will fit this category. The
channels start out as private property, and they remain private prop-
erty. They are not created by the government. They are channels
which have no identity before they are taken by the government,
and the cable operator gets to choose them. They still have most
of the indices of private property. Also the 1996 Act says that
cable operators are not supposed to be regulated as common carri-
ers.
20 1
There is also the claim by the adult programmers that they are
disadvantaged over other access programmers and providers.20 2
First, the program provider does not lose his or her statutory claim
to access. They only lose their absolute right to program indecent
material. They are still in the favored position of being able to
offer any other programming that they want on the cable system
and preventing the cable operator from exercising editorial control.
Regarding indecent programming, it really assumes the status
of most other programmers non-access channels. You have got to
produce something that the cable company believes subscribers
want badly enough so they will air it, because it will attract more
subscribers and increase the revenue of the cable system.
We also argued to the Supreme Court that even if there is state
action here, you cannot use the strict scrutiny test.20 3 We do not
read Pacifica the way the government does. I will not today, and
we do not in the Supreme Court, defend section 10(b) standing
alone. When the government insists on something from a First
Amendment speaker, you have got to prohibit it under certain cir-
cumstances. Since it is a First Amendment speaker that is making
the decision, not the government, you cannot use the same test-is
there a compelling interest, and is it the least restrictive alternative.
201. 47 U.S.C. § 541(c).
202. Brief for Petitioner Alliance at 28-29.
203. See Brief for Amicus Curiae Time Warner at 20-23.
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In Establishment Clause cases, there is very often a fight be-
tween the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause, and
the courts have balanced the two in order to come up with some
kind of test to figure out where to draw the line.2°4 Here, again, it
has to be nothing more than a reasonableness test, because you
have a First Amendment speaker that is making the decisions.
Even if adult programmers are found to be asserting First Amend-
ment rights, it simply cannot be true that program providers and
viewers desiring access to this programming through cable televi-
sion have greater rights than cable operators and the subscribers
who either want to reject the programming or limit it.
On New York's cable systems, notwithstanding converters
which have locking mechanisms, the cable operators have been
getting a very large number of complaints about the programming
on leased access. In New York, the cable operator does not really
administer the public access channels. While there is some amount
of indecent programming there, we do not hear quite as many com-
plaints, but we still occasionally get complaints about public ac-
cess. The majority of the recent complaints concern leased access.
A lot of subscribers do not want unrestricted access. Not only
because they are concerned about children, but also for unsuspect-
ing adult viewers who find this material not to their liking and do
not want to stumble upon it when they're channel surfing. Section
10 allows the cable operator to adopt an approach, such as Time
Warner did in New York, that is reasonable in balancing the com-
peting interests of its First Amendment rights with the interests of
programmers and both groups of subscribers-those who want the
programming and those who do not.20 5 Indeed, by placing the
decision on indecent programming in the cable operator's hands,
the government, in practical effect, has removed itself from the
decision process. As far as government censorship, it is the least
intrusive approach, or the least restrictive approach.
204. See Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,
802 (1973) (Mem. Opinion) (Burger, C.J. concurring in part and dissenting in part); see
also Katcoff v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 223, 234 n.4 (2d Cir. 1985); Kenneth L. Karst, Equality
as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 20, 48 (1975).
205. 1992 Act § 10(a), (c), 47 U.S.C. §§ 532(h), 531.
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Permitting the cable operator to refuse to telecast indecent pro-
gramming altogether or to restrict it does not impede First Amend-
ment rights. It merely recognizes them. If the cable operator
somehow is unreasonable in its decision making, Congress has
managed to leave a right of action under section 612(d) for the
cable operator to sue over a decision on leased access where the
cable operator restricted, for example, prohibited programming.2 °"
If the leased access programmer believed that the cable operator
was restricting programming Congress did not intend to restrict or
ban, there may be an action under section 612(d), a federal claim,
which I am sure at some point I will probably see.
The last very interesting thing that has me puzzled about the
1996 Act is that it again amends the public access and leased ac-
cess sections of the other acts.2°7 The 1996 Act allows the cable
operator to refuse to telecast any leased access program or portion
of a leased access program that contains obscenity, indecency, or
nudity. However, Congress. did not repeal the, section 10 amend-
208 bl nments, so it is belt and suspenders, I guess, because there was
one system that allowed cable operators to reject or restrict pro-
gramming, and now there is another section. I assume that Con-
gress is preparing for the possibility that section 10 will be struck
down this June, which I trust it won't be.2° 9 If it should be struck
down, there will already be a new provision which provides for
blocking mechanisms. It does not have section 10(b), but just
returns absolute discretion to the cable operator.
My assumption is that it will not satisfy the adult program
providers. Even if the Alliance case holds that section 10 is uncon-
stitutional, there will be a challenge to this section, and we'll have
another forum about that in a couple of years.
PROF. FRANZESE: Thank you. I'm happy to introduce to
you now, Mr. Andrew Schwartzman.
206. 47 U.S.C. § 532(d).
207. 1996 Act, Pub. L. No. 104-102, 110 Stat. § 56 (to be codified in scattered
sections of 47 U.S.C.).
208. 1992 Act § 20, 47 U.S.C. § 551.
209. Denver Area Educ. Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct.
471 (1995).
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MR. SCHWARTZMAN: You folks have been very patient and
very attentive, and as time is moving on, I think I will compress
my remarks a little bit.
I agree with everything that Jim Horwood said. And I agree
with everything that Marjorie Heins said. I agree with everything
that Bob Perry said, and I disagree with everything that Stuart Gold
said. That is really all you need to know.
There has been a lot of law discussed here, so I am going to
make a couple of policy observations to try to place this in some
context, partially because it is a little bit unfair that we're all gang-
ing up on Stuart Gold here but I think I'll wind up ganging up
anyway.
My point is where we're going and the danger of doing what
I think Mr. Gold has just done, which is treating the First Amend-
ment as a commercial weapon to censor, not a shield to protect
speech.
The visual aid here quotes the First Amendment, Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of or abridging the free-
dom of speech or of the press.2 0 The real question is whether a
law which restricts speech is unconstitutional. Laws which pro-
mote speech are permissible and encouraged by the First Amend-
ment,21 and that is really how I view section 10 of the 1992 Act.
Stuart Gold is correct. Time Warner is free to put on a pro-
gram with him tap dancing naked, and I would pay to watch that.
They would do it if it would make enough money. I suspect that
there are other people tap dancing naked who would generate better
revenue, Stuart, I'm sorry to say.
MR. GOLD: I concede that.
MR. SCHWARTZMAN: But, that is the point. The very same
programming literally can and may appear on Time Warner's own
channels pursuant to the policies that they presently follow-if they
can make good money at it-and they're claiming the right to
210. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
211. See FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 755, 801
(1978) (finding a regulation constitutional, based in part on its promotion of free speech).
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refuse to lease or refuse to permit that very same programming to
be carried on access channels, subject to other people's editorial
control.
I think it is fair to point out here that these channels, if they
become effectively nullified and less well used, become additional
profit centers for cable operators. The fewer people that are will-
ing to lease gives more channels to the cable operators. Cable
operators are free to put their own programming on access channels
which are not being leased at a given moment or on PEG channels
which are not being utilized at a given moment.
Stuart's diversity is not my diversity. Seventy channels select-
ed by Time Warner is multiplicity, but it is not diversity. It is one
editor. I would point out that Time Warner has interests or owns,
among other things, HBO, Cinemax, TBS, TNT, CNN, CNN Head-
lineNews, and Court TV. That is not really the kind of diversity
that we have contemplated. The objective of the First Amendment
is to create a well informed electorate to enhance the dissemination
of issues, ideas, and thoughts.
In erecting a very unfortunate scheme for cable television, Con-
gress and the FCC did little. They insured that there would be a
tiny opportunity for different voices to appear and that there would
be room for civic discourse on public educational-governmental
channels.213 We're talking about an electronic future which,
through great efficiencies and the use of technology at reduced
costs and increased responsiveness, brings the government closer
to the people including instant voting, constant referenda, and elec-
214tronic town meetings. However, this is not going to happen if
it is all subjected to the editorial control of a single cable operator
or, even more generally and truly threatening, a single telephone
company or a single cable operator merged with a single telephone
212. See Bill Carey, Who Will Buy Gaylord Entertainment?, TULSA WORLD, Jan. 16,
1996, E6 (noting that Time Warner owns Cinemax and HBO and that if they merge with
Turner Broadcasting, they will also own CNN, TBS, TNT, CNN and Headline News).
213. S. REP. No. 367, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1994).
214. See e.g., Glenn H. Reynolds, Is Democracy Like Sex?, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1635,
1648 (1995) (comparing democracy to sex in order to understand the role of democracy
in our constitutional system and the suggested reforms for that system).
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company. The core of this then becomes Stuart Gold's claim that
this is somehow private property. Whose streets do these wires
travel through? Whose rivers do these wires transgress? Whose
telephone poles do they go on?
Any cable television signal that comes imported from any-
where-through the air, from a satellite, across a state line, through
wire, or across a river-has federal jurisdiction, through the benefit
of takings provisions that guarantee cable operators access to land-
lords' homes.215 The cable operator's preemption of local zoning
for satellite dishes, a mass of additional preemption, is contained
in the 1996 Act.216 There is state action all over the place here.
This is public property that they're using, and it was always public
property. When cable franchises permitted cable operators to use
the streets and to gain access to the homes, they conditioned the
access, in most city cases, upon access channels as a condition of
the award of the franchise. If you did not want to volunteer to
apply for the franchise, you did not have to. If you volunteered to
apply for the franchise, you had to agree to provide access chan-
nels.217
So what happens when you assert this kind of property interest?
What happens in a repressive environment where the federal gov-
ernment is looking to censor and Congress looking to censor even
more? Here is what happens. The government says they think
they are private property, but we can regulate private property.
The government is going to regulate more private property. They
say state action is not such a bad thing because we like that kind
of state action and because we can use it to censor.
That is what the government did in the Alliance case. Stuart
Gold alluded to the fact that he has requested ten minutes to argue
this week. It is important to see why that happened. Although the
government argued in the Court of Appeals in Alliance, vocifer-
ously, that there is no state action in sections 10(a) through (d) of
the 1992 Act, the Solicitor General last week filed a brief which
215. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
216. 1996 Act § 205(b), 47 U.S.C. § 303.
217. 47 U.S.C. § 541(a)(4)(B).
[Vol. 6:465
SYMPOSIUM-PANEL ON ACCESS CHANNELS
says, well, we now agree section 10(b) is state action, and they
said, we sort of agree that sections 10(a) and 10(c) are state action,
although it is a little bit mealy-mouthed, it is sort of conceding a
point they know they cannot win. They say, that is okay because
this Court can and should extend the Pacifica decision, which pres-
ently applies only to broadcasting, to cover cable. I now incorpo-
rate, by reference, everything Marjorie Heins said.
Stuart Gold now needs his ten minutes to argue because he
needs to convince the Supreme Court not to require a safe harbor
from 10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. on HBO, because Jesse Helms is
ready to do that.18
What happens when you try to use the First Amendment as a
commercial weapon is that you wind up having the flip side of the
First Amendment thrown back at you which is dangerous, as a
matter of policy.
Access channels are an important safety valve that enables
cable operators to say diversity exists and that cable operators have
no control. Instead, Congress is moving in to censor all of their
channels. It is an unfortunate potential outcome, and if I were not
confident that the Supreme Court was going to declare the whole
thing unconstitutional, I would be even more worried than I am.
Thank you.
PROF. FRANZESE: Are there questions for any of our panel-
ists?
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Professor Frank Ascan
of Rutgers Law School in Newark. I would like to direct a ques-
tion to the other panelists as to the relationship between the P and
the G in PEG channels, which is becoming a particular problem as
more and more local governing bodies, or political bodies, actually
take over the operation of these PEG channels as the cable opera-
tor. In New Jersey, for example, it is becoming particularly preva-
lent. There is one PEG channel and a politically appointed body
runs it. What are the priorities? How do we determine the priori-
218. See Robert Corn-Revere, Mixed Messages on the First Amendment; Television
Broadcasting of Indecent Material Ruling, 125 BROADCASTING & CABLE 43 (1995).
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ties between P and G? Can this political body transform this pub-
lic forum into basically a forum for governmental viewpoint? Can
it restrict the public viewpoint by placing it at inconvenient hours
and dominating prime time with a political viewpoint through the
voice of government officials? What is the relationship between
the P and G in PEG?
MR. HORWOOD: I guess I can open this. It is a problem and
we have really been talking today about the public access rather
than the educational and governmental access which can also be
provided.
The way the 1992 Act is written, it does not require a commu-
nity which mandates a government access channel to require a
public access channel.219 I think there is a very serious constitu-
tional problem if you have government access without public ac-
cess.220  It has not been raised by the courts yet. I think there
would be a very different issue on viewing the constitutionality
where there is only government access. While permitting only
government access may survive strict scrutiny, it is a much more
problematic issue than where you also have public access.
I have a real problem from a policy standpoint of permitting the
government to speak on a channel, and not providing a vehicle
over the same medium for those who are critical of the government
to speak also. I think defending the government from a constitu-
tional standpoint regarding educational access is more difficult than
from a public standpoint, because the public access is completely
content neutral. Public access, particularly if it is found to be a
public forum, cannot be limited. It must be on a first come first
served basis, or a lottery basis, so as to not distinguish among
speakers.
Once the channels are set up for the public to distinguish
219. See 47 U.S.C. § 531(b) (allowing for a franchise authority to require channels
to be set aside for public, educational, or governmental use).
220. See James M. Horwood, Public, Educational, and Governmental Access on
Cable Television: A Model to Assure Reasonable Access to the Information Superhighway
for All People in Fulfillment of the First Amendment Guarantee of Free Speech, 25 SETON
HALL L. REV. 1413 (1995).
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among speakers, there is a very difficult First Amendment bur-
den.221 There is a good challenge where a channel, managed by the
government, favors the government in terms of time availability.
The public access channels are managed in different ways.
Historically, many were managed by cable operators.222 There are
fewer now. The best way of managing the public access channels
is through a separate non-profit organization which is completely
separate from the government.223 Occasionally access is successful-
ly managed by government.224 Other times it is managed by a
junior college or by a library.225 There are a variety of ways to
manage public access channels.
The farther removed from the government a public access chan-
nel is, the less opportunity for mischief and the easier it is to de-
fend the public access channel.226
MR. GOLD: In the D.C. Circuit argument, the panel of judges
was pretty interested in the public access PEG issues.227 One of the
points I tried to make was that the P may be a closer question as
to whether there should be strict scrutiny. However, as to the edu-
cational and governmental, the government not only could run a
general PEG channel, but the statutes require a governmental chan-
nel.228 Those two channels, educational and governmental, are
clearly content based and require strict scrutiny. I would be sur-
221. See Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2460-61 (finding that speakers were not distinguished
based on content, but the manner in which the message was transmitted, therefore there
was no presumption of First Amendment invalidity).
222. See Alliance, 10 F.3d at 821-22 (noting that traditionally, cable operators man-
aged many of the public access channels).
223. See Wally Mueller, Controversial Programming on Cable Television's Public
Access Channels: The Limits of Governmental Response, 38 DEPAUL L. REV. 1051, 1120
n.338 (stating that non-profit managers were more likely to promote use of public access
channels).
224. Id. at 1105 (noting that access managers fall into three categories: (1) cable
operator; (2) an arm of the local government; and (3) nonprofit access management
corporations).
225. Id. at 1063.
226. Mueller, supra note 65, at 1120 n.338 ("Non-profit access managers are insulat-
ed from political pressures felt by municipal access managers.").
227. Alliance, 10 F.3d at 815-16.
228. 1992 Act § 5, 47 U.S.C. 535.
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prised if the Court went this way, but it is not impossible that the
court could strike down the educational and governmental elements
as not getting strict scrutiny and not surviving a compelling state
interest test, while having a closer issue on the public access.
My experience is based mostly in large cities which have public
access channels, even if they're run by a governmental body. It is
mostly a first come, first served basis. Perhaps New Jersey has an
access channel and the government or appointed governmental
body runs it, but the best time probably goes to the city council
meetings and debates for certain politicians.
In most large cities, no matter who controls, there is a true
public access channel which is usually run on a first come, first
served basis.229
PROF. FRANZESE: Other questions or comments?
AUDIENCE MEMBER: This is a question for Mr. Gold. In
relation to section 10 and Time Warner's decision to, in effect,
force people to ask for channel 35, how does that request square
with the right to privacy of individuals who, regardless of whether
they're labeled a porn subscriber, simply do not want to tell Time
Warner, "this is what I want?" They should not have to do or say
anything in order to protect their right of privacy.
MR. GOLD: A couple of things. First, you send in the card
and your right to privacy is protected because by federal law there
are severe consequelces if a cable operator allows disclosure of a
viewer's choices on the system.230 Thus, there is a federal statute
that makes this a crime,23' and there are civil penalties232 and there
have been cases on point.233
Second, you have to make choices all the time. If you want to
get the Playboy channel, you have to tell us and the computer logs
229. See, e.g., Symposium, supra note 78, at 837.
230. 47 U.S.C. §§ 551(f), 558.
231. 47 U.S.C. § 558.
232. 1992 Act § 20, 47 U.S.C. § 551.
233. See, e.g., Ripplinger v. Collins, 868 F.2d 1043 (9th Cir. 1989) (criminal and
civil liabilities); Texas v. Synchronal Corp., 800 F. Supp. 1456 (W.D. Tex. 1992) (civil
liability).
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in that you have ordered the Playboy channel and your bill is going
to show it. If you want to walk into the magazine store and buy
Al Goldstein's Screw magazine, you have no right to say, "I don't
want to have to pick up this magazine. I'm going to somehow get
it surreptitiously." You have to make choices all the time. Beyond
that, the card has to be protected. It just says you want channel 35
programming. I donot see how that in any way severely infringes
on your right of privacy, especially since it is a commercial trans-
action. The cable company is not the government. The cable com-
pany is somebody supplying a service. Other subscribers have a
problem, the company is trying to be responsive to that problem.
They're trying to balance everyone's interests.
But I think the fact that over 50,000 sent the cards in shows
that individuals are unlikely to feel this is an invasion of their pri-
vacy. The truth of the matter is that there are a lot of things on the
cable system, as well as in your day to day work, that you have to
order. A problem only occurs when the government asks you to
register. I think this is very different. This is not like Lamont v.
Postmaster General,234 where the government said, if you want
communist propaganda send us a card saying that you want it, then
we will let you have it.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: This question is for Mr.
Schwartzman. It seems as though the cable operator is trying to
compare itself to a newspaper or magazine in being able to exer-
cise editorial discretion. You say there is a difference in that cable
operators use public rights of way for their wires and telephone
polls, etc. How do you respond to the answer that newspapers are
sold in vending machines on public sidewalks and that magazines
use the malls, even at reduced rates?
MR. SCHWARTZMAN: This is the old postal road argument.
Anybody can start a newspaper and anybody can distribute a news-
paper or a print publication essentially without restriction. People
used to argue that to effectively create a daily newspaper there
were economic restrictions and bars of just cost. But I do not see
234. 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
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why the comparison must be made to a daily newspaper. Opera-
tion of a daily newspaper is wide open. Just as it is wide open to
go out on the street corner and speak, subject to the normal time,
place and matter restrictions for public nuisance and so forth.
Cable broadcasting is different. In order to operate a cable
system through public rights of way or in order to transmit in the
electromagnetic spectrum, you need governmental permission or
right, which the government does not just confer on everybody.
Many libertarians think that we should open up the electromagnetic
spectrum.235 They say that we should let everybody have access
and let the tort system handle any problems. The theory is if you
jump on my property or interfere with my transmission, I'll sue
you in tort.
The future of cyberspace law depends on whether you believe
the proposition that no one owns cyberspace, which is Mr. Gold's
proposition, or that everyone owns cyberspace, which is my propo-
sition. Depending on which of those choices you make, you say
that the First Amendment justifies actions to promote discussion,
debate, create an informed electorate and to protect against suppres-
sion of speech, or you condone, encourage and create forms of
private censorship.
PROF. FRANZESE: Thank you.
MR. HORWOOD: I would like to add a bit to Mr.
Schwartzman's remarks. The debate over cable regulation as it has
evolved started out with cable operators saying they were like
newspapers and they ought to be treated like newspapers.236 Fran-
chising authorities particularly say that cable operators are not like
newspapers and that there is a scarcity in cable. They believe
cable operators are like broadcasters and should be regulated as
235. See Rett R. Ludwidowski, Fundamental Constitutional Rights In The New
Constitutions of Eastern & Central Europe, 3 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 73, 157 (1995)
(noting that the only restrictions on creating a private newspaper are financial backing and
public interest).
236. See, e.g., Community Communication Co. v. Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370, 1375
(10th Cir. 1981) (noting that petitioners contend they are more like newspapers than
wireless broadcasters).
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such. The Supreme Court, first in Los Angeles v. Preferred Com-
munications Inc.,237 and most recently in Turner, has said that cable
is a different medium and it is going to have different rules found
somewhere between newspapers and broadcast. There is some
element of scarcity because you, as a speaker/programmer, cannot
come in and say, "I want to speak and therefore I'm going to build
a cable system." This is like printing a pamphlet.
Traditionally, there has been one monopoly cable operator. The
1992 Act was supposed to encourage more than one.23' The 1996
Act does.239
If you do have more than one operator, and therefore competi-
tion, you are going to have two or three cable systems in a commu-
nity, but not hundreds of cable operators. What we are going to
have is majoritarian speech.
I think a vivid example of where public access was important
as something different from majoritarian speech occurred during
the Gulf War when the government position was being focused on
and essentially promoted on all the networks as well as CNN and
public broadcasting. The only program on television that was criti-
cal of the government, position in the Gulf War was on public ac-
cess channels.
As long as you're going to allow people to be editors who are
going to look towards a majoritarian view, they are going to put on
programming that will respond to people who criticize and are
offended by the programming. Speakers will be excluded who may
have something important to say. What would happen if you
wound up with one or two organizations owning all the cable sys-
tems, and they've got to rely on tobacco companies for advertising?
It is unlikely there will be programming critical of the tobacco
industry.
MR. GOLD: I would like to add one thing. The Supreme
Court has not seen the analogy between cable operators and news-
237. 476 U.S. 488, 494-95 (1986).
238. S. REP. No. 92, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
239. H.R. REP. No. 459, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
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papers, but much of the talk has been centered around the idea that
in the print media you can publish a pamphlet or put out Screw
magazine. In television, you cannot put your programming on
unless you satisfy this one editor.
Back before leased access, a number of people in New York
City wanted to do begin what was called Channel 1, but no broad-
caster could under the standards. It was political, it was sexual,
there were genitals everywhere, and it was very funny. Obviously
they could not get on television, so they leased what was then
known as Theater 4 on 4th Street in New York City's East Village.
They had 125 to 150 seats, put in four television monitors, called
it Channel 1, and sold tickets. It started out very small. Then they
made more money and they had a third edition. Eventually Chan-
nel 1 became what was known as the Groove Tube which became
a motion picture and was shown on lots of college campuses. It
was the progenitor to Kentucky Fried Movie, which was John
Landis' version of it. Even today, there are ways that you can get
your message heard. You can have your say, even if the cable
operator does not think it's subscribers want it.
MR. GOLD: We agree on something, all right.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My question is for Mr. Schwartzman.
Mr. Gold admitted that Time Warner, in fact, owns a lot of the
cable channels or programs. You were discussing the idea of di-
versity, and I was just wondering whether this is a diversity of
ownership idea? Is that what fosters the diversity for you, the
diversity of the ownership, or is it in fact particular decisions about
their programming that you feel inhibits the diversity?
MR. SCHWARTZMAN: Mr. Gold, I'm sure would say, and
I agree, it is not a question of admitting ownership of channels.
It's being proud of ownership of those channels, and that is impor-
tant.
It is highly desirable that effective, well funded, technically
adept, creative people have the resources of a company like Time-
Warner to help produce interesting, important, imaginative, and
generally mainstream programming. It is important to the econo-
my, it is important to free speech, it is important to the marketplace
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of ideas. But, if you simply view this as an anti-trust issue and an
HHI index2" about technical ownership, you're missing the First
Amendment point.
The First Amendment point is that with ownership of the ex-
pressive means of communication comes an opportunity directly
and indirectly to control the content.24' Examples abound and I do
not want to get too far off on it. I think it is sufficient to point out
that the means of insuring that there are different points of view is
to use government to insure that different points of view are al-
lowed to be expressed.
One of the most important parts of the 1992 Act, which has not
been touched by Congress, is section 19 which says that the verti-
cally integrated cable companies, like Time Warner, must make
their programming available to competing video providers on a
non-discriminatory basis.242 It was only after enactment of that
provision that General Motors was willing to write the check and
commit to launch the satellite which now gives us DirectTV, the
new small dish competitor to cable that may give cable a run for
its money and does give us some competition. 3
There is an interplay between economic regulation and structur-
al rules about ownership and content. I would simply observe that
it is far more desirable to set up a structure on a content neutral
basis to achieve diversity by allowing different voices to have ac-
cess than it is to impose after the fact content based intrusive mea-
sure to try to achieve the same kinds of objectives.
I'm a big advocate of the fairness doctrine, in something like
the fairness doctrine for the future in a new multi-channel environ-
240. The Hefindahl-Hirschman Index is "calculated by summing the squares of the
individual market shares of all the firms in [a] market. Markets with an HHI greater than
200 are highly concentrated." United States v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., 781 F. Supp.
1400, 1413 (S.D. Iowa 1991).
241. Steele v. FCC, 770 F.2d 1192, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Wald, J., dissenting)
(noting that diversity of ownership is directly connected to diversity of ideas).
242. 47 U.S.C. § 548 (1995).
243. Barbara Rattle, Texas Firm to Begin Offering Digital Satellite TV Service in
Two Utah Counties, ENTERPRISE, May 2, 1994, § 1 (noting that DirectTV began in 1991
at the cost of $1 billion).
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ment.2 4 I do think we should have structural measures to insure
diversity.
PROF. FRANZESE: I'd like to thank all of our fine panelists.
244. The fairness doctrine, imposed by the FCC on radio and television broadcasters,
required them to broadcast discussions of public issues. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 368 (1969). The doctrine required that broadcasters give adequate
coverage to public issues and reflect all views. Id. at 377. In 1987, the FCC abolished
the doctrine. 63 R.R.2d 541 (1987) (concluding that the fairness doctrine violated the
First Amendment and contravened public policy).
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